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Abstract
This paper develops a Reasoning about Actions and Change
framework integrated with Default Reasoning, suitable as
a Knowledge Representation and Reasoning framework for
Story Comprehension. The proposed framework, which is
guided strongly by existing knowhow from the Psychology
of Reading and Comprehension, is based on the theory of
argumentation from AI. It uses argumentation to capture ap-
propriate solutions to the frame, ramification and qualifica-
tion problems and generalizations of these problems required
for text comprehension. In this first part of the study the work
concentrates on the central problem of integration (or elabo-
ration) of the explicit information from the narrative in the
text with the implicit (in the reader’s mind) common sense
world knowledge pertaining to the topic(s) of the story given
in the text. We also report on our empirical efforts to gather
background common sense world knowledge used by humans
when reading a story and to evaluate, through a prototype sys-
tem, the ability of our approach to capture both the majority
and the variability of understanding of a story by the human
readers in the experiments.
Introduction
Text comprehension has long been identified as a key test
for Artificial Intelligence (AI). Aside from its central posi-
tion in many forms of the Turing Test, it is clear that human
computer interaction could benefit enormously from this and
other forms of natural language processing. The rise of com-
puting over the Internet, where so much data is in the form
of textual information, has given even greater importance to
this topic. This paper reports on a research program aim-
ing to learn from the (extensive) study of text comprehen-
sion in Psychology in order to draw guidelines for develop-
ing frameworks for automating narrative text comprehension
and in particular, story comprehension (SC).
Our research program brings together knowhow from
Psychology and AI, in particular, our understanding of Rea-
soning about Actions and Change and Argumentation in AI,
to provide a formal framework of representation and a com-
putational framework for SC, that can be empirically evalu-
ated and iteratively developed given the results of the eval-
uation. This empirical evaluation, which forms an impor-
tant part of the program, is based on the following method-
ology: (i) set up a set of stories and a set of questions to
test different aspects of story comprehension; (ii) harness the
world knowledge on which human readers base their com-
prehension; (iii) use this world knowledge in our framework
and automated system and compare its comprehension be-
haviour with that of the source of the world knowledge.
In this paper we will concentrate on the development of
an appropriate Reasoning about Actions and Change and
Default Reasoning framework for representing narratives
extracted from stories together with the background world
knowledge needed for the underlying central process for
story comprehension of synthesizing and elaborating the ex-
plicit text information with new inferences through the im-
plicit world knowledge of the reader. In order to place this
specific consideration in the overall process of story compre-
hension we present here a brief summary of the problem of
story comprehension from the psychological point of view.
A Psychological Account of Story Comprehension
Comprehending text entails the construction of a men-
tal representation of the information contained in the text.
However, no text specifies clearly and completely all the
implications of text ideas or the relations between them.
Therefore, comprehension depends on the ability to men-
tally represent the text-given information and to gener-
ate bridging and elaborative inferences that connect and
elaborate text ideas resulting in a mental or comprehen-
sion model of the story. Inference generation is neces-
sary in order to comprehend any text as a whole, i.e.,
as a single network of interconnected propositions in-
stead of as a series of isolated sentences, and to appre-
ciate the suspense and surprise that characterize narrative
texts or stories, in particular (Brewer and Lichtenstein 1982;
McNamara and Magliano 2009).
Although inference generation is based on the activa-
tion of background world knowledge, the process is con-
strained by text information. Concepts encountered in the
text activate related conceptual knowledge in the readers’
long-term memory (Kintsch 1988). In the case of sto-
ries, knowledge about mental states, emotions, and moti-
vations is also relevant as the events depicted tend to re-
volve around them. Nevertheless, at any given point in the
process, only a small subset of all the possible knowledge-
based inferences remain activated and become part of the
mental representation: those that connect and elaborate
text information in a way that contributes to the coher-
ence of the mental model (McNamara and Magliano 2009;
Rapp and den Broek 2005). Inference generation is a task-
oriented process that follows the principle of cognitive
economy enforced by a limited-resource cognitive system.
However, the results of this coherence-driven selection
mechanism can easily exceed the limited working memory
capacity of the human cognitive system. Therefore, coher-
ence on a more global level is achieved through higher-
level integration processes that operate to create macro-
propositions that generalize or subsume a number of text-
encountered concepts and the inferences that connected
them. In the process, previously selected information that
maintains few connections to other information is dropped
from the mental model. This results in a more consolidated
network of propositions that serves as the new anchor for
processing subsequent text information (Kintsch 1998).
Comprehension also requires an iterative general revision
mechanism of the mental model that readers construct. The
feelings of suspense and surprise that stories aim to cre-
ate are achieved through discontinuities or changes (in set-
tings, motivations, actions, or consequences) that are not
predictable or are wrongly predictable solely on the basis
of the mental model created so far. Knowledge about the
structure and the function of stories leads readers to expect
discontinuities and to use them as triggers to revise their
mental model (Zwaan 1994). Therefore, a change in time
or setting in the text may serve as a clue for revising parts
of the mental model while other parts remain and integrated
with subsequent text information.
The interaction of bottom-up and top-down processes for
the purposes of coherence carries the possibility of different
but equally legitimate or successful comprehension out-
comes. Qualitative and quantitative differences in concep-
tual and mental state knowledge can give rise to differences
between the mental models constructed by different read-
ers. Nevertheless, comprehension is successful if these are
primarily differences in elaboration but not in the level of
coherence of the final mental model.
In this paper we will focus on the underlying lower-level
task of constructing the possibly additional elements of the
comprehension model and the process of revising these ele-
ments as the story unfolds with only a limited concern on the
global requirements of coherence and cognitive economy.
Our working hypothesis is that these higher level features
of comprehension can be tackled on top of the underlying
framework that we are developing in this paper, either at the
level of the representational structures and language or with
additional computational processes on top of the underlying
computational framework defined in this paper. We are also
assuming as solved the orthogonal issue of correctly pars-
ing the natural language of the text into some information-
equivalent structured (e.g., logical) form that gives us the
explicit narrative of the story. This is not to say that this is-
sue is not an important element of narrative text comprehen-
sion. Indeed, it may need to be tackled in conjunction with
the problems on which we are focusing (since, for example,
the problem of de-referencing pronoun and article anaphora
could depend on background world knowledge and hence
possibly on the higher-level whole comprehension of the
text (Levesque, Davis, and Morgenstern 2012).
In the next two sections we will develop an appropriate
representation framework using preference based argumen-
tation that enables us to address well all the three major
problems of frame, ramification and qualification and pro-
vide an associated revision process. The implementation of
a system discussed after this shows how psychologically-
inspired story comprehension can proceed as a sequence of
elaboration and revision. The paper then presents, using the
empirical methodology suggested by research in psychol-
ogy, our initial efforts to evaluate how closely the inferences
drawn by our framework and system match those given by
humans engaged in a story comprehension task.
The following story will be used as a running example.
Story: It was the night of Christmas Eve. After feeding the
animals and cleaning the barn, Papa Joe took his shotgun
from above the fireplace and sat out on the porch cleaning
it. He had had this shotgun since he was young, and it had
never failed him, always making a loud noise when it fired.
Papa Joe woke up early at dawn, picked up his shotgun
and went off to forest. He walked for hours, until the sight of
two turkeys in the distance made him stop suddenly. A bird
on a tree nearby was cheerfully chirping away, building its
nest. He aimed at the first turkey, and pulled the trigger.
After a moment’s thought, he opened his shotgun and saw
there were no bullets in the shotgun’s chamber. He loaded
his shotgun, aimed at the turkey and pulled the trigger again.
Undisturbed, the bird nearby continued to chirp and build
its nest. Papa Joe was very confused. Would this be the first
time that his shotgun had let him down?
The story above along with other stories and material
used for the evaluation of our approach can be found at
http://cognition.ouc.ac.cy/narrative/.
KRR for Story Comprehension
We will use methods and results from Ar-
gumentation Theory in AI (e.g., (Dung 1995;
Modgil and Prakken 2012)) and its links to the area
of Reasoning about Action and Change (RAC) with
Default Reasoning on the static properties of domains
(see (van Harmelen, Lifschitz, and Porter 2008) for an
overview) to develop a Knowledge Representation and Rea-
soning (KRR) framework suitable for Story Comprehension
(SC). Our central premise is that SC can be formalized in
terms of argumentation accounting for the qualification and
the revision of the inferences drawn as we read a story.
The psychological research and understanding of SC will
guide us in the way we exploit the know how from AI. The
close link between human common sense reasoning, such as
that for SC, and argumentation has been recently re-enforced
by new psychological evidence (Mercier and Sperber 2011)
suggesting that human reasoning is in its general form in-
herently argumentative. In our proposed approach of KRR
for SC the reasoning to construct a comprehension model
and its qualification at all levels as the story unfolds will be
captured through a uniform acceptability requirement on the
arguments that support the conclusions in the model.
The significance of this form of representation for SC is
that it makes easy the elaboration of new inferences from the
explicit information in the narrative, that, as we discussed
in the introduction, is crucially necessary for the successful
comprehension of stories. On the other hand, this easy form
of elaboration and the extreme form of qualification that
it needs can be mitigated by the requirement, again given
from the psychological perspective, that elaborative infer-
ences need to be grounded on the narrative and sceptical in
nature. In other words, the psychological perspective of SC,
that also suggests that story comprehension is a process of
“fast thinking”, leads us to depart from a standard logical
view of drawing conclusions based on the truth in all (pre-
ferred) models. Instead, the emphasis is turned on building
one grounded and well-founded model from a collection of
solid or sceptical properties that are grounded on the text and
follow as unqualified conclusions.
We use a typical RAC language of Fluents, Actions,
Times, with an extra sort of Actors. An actor-action pair
is an event, and a fluent/event or its negation is a literal. For
this paper it suffices to represent times as natural numbers1
and to assume that time-points are dense between story el-
ements to allow for the realization of indirect effects. Ar-
guments will be build from premises in the knowledge con-
nected to any given story. We will have three types of such
knowledge units as premises or basic units of arguments.
Definition 1. Let L be a fluent literal, X a fluent/event lit-
eral and S a set of fluent/event literals. A unit argument or
premise has one of following forms:
• a unit property argument pro(X,S) or prec(X,S);
• a unit causal argument cau(X,S);
• a unit persistence argument per(L, {L}) (which we
sometimes write as per(L, ·)).
These three forms are called types of unit arguments. A unit
argument of any type is denoted by arg
i
(Hi, Bi). The two
forms of unit property arguments differ in that pro(X,S) re-
lates properties to each other at the same time-point, whereas
prec(X,S) aims to capture preconditions that hold at the
time-point of an event, under which the event is blocked
from bringing about its effects at the subsequent time-point.
With abuse of terminology we will sometimes call these
units of arguments, simply as arguments.
The knowledge required for the comprehension of a story
comprises of two parts: the explicit knowledge of the nar-
rative extracted from the text of the story and the implicit
background knowledge that the reader uses along with the
narrative for elaborative inferences about the story.
Definition 2. A world knowledge theory W is a set of unit
property and causal arguments together with a (partial) ir-
reflexive priority relation on them. A narrative N is: a set
of observations OBS(X,T ) for a fluent/event literalX , and a
time-point T ; together with a (possibly empty) set of (story
specific) property or causal unit arguments.
The priority relation in W would typically reflect the pri-
ority of specificity for properties, expressed by unit property
arguments pro(X,S), or the priority of precondition prop-
erties, expressed by unit property arguments prec(X,S),
1In general, abstract time points called scenes are useful.
over causal effects, expressed by unit causal arguments. This
priority amongst these basic units of knowledge gives a form
of non-monotonic reasoning (NMR) for deriving new prop-
erties that hold in the story.
To formalize this NMR we use a form of preference-based
argumentation uniformly to capture the static (default) infer-
ence of properties at a single time point as well as inferences
between different type points, by extending the domain spe-
cific priority relation to address the frame problem.
Definition 3. A story representation SR = 〈W ,N ,≻〉
comprises a world knowledge theory W , a narrative N ,
and a (partial) irreflexive priority relation ≻ extending the
one in W so that: (i) cau(H,B1) ≻ per(¬H,B2); (ii)
per(H,B1) ≻ pro(¬H,B2). The extended relation≻may
also prioritize between arguments inN and those inW (typ-
ically the former over the latter).
The first priority condition, namely that causal arguments
have priority over persistence arguments, encompasses a so-
lution to the frame problem. When we need to reason with
defeasible property information, such as default rules about
the normal state of the world in which a story takes place,
we are also faced with a generalized frame problem, where
“a state of the world persists irrespective of the existence
of general state laws”. Hence, if we are told that the world
is in fact in some exceptional state that violates a general
(default) property this will continue to be the case in the fu-
ture, until we learn of (or derive) some causal information
that returns the world into its normal state. The solution to
this generalized frame problem is captured succinctly by the
second general condition on the priority relation of a story
representation and its combination with the first condition.
A representation SR of our example story (focusing on
its ending) may include the following unit arguments in W
and N (where pj is short for “Papa Joe”):
c1 : cau(fired at(pj,X), {aim(pj,X), pull trigger(pj)})
c2 : cau(¬alive(X), {fired at(pj,X), alive(X)})
c3 : cau(noise, {fired at(pj,X)})
c4 : cau(¬chirp(bird), {noise, nearby(bird)})
c5 : cau(gun loaded, {load gun})
p1 : prec(¬fired at(pj,X), {¬gun loaded})
p2 : pro(¬fired at(pj,X), {¬noise}) (story specific)
with p1 ≻ c1, p2 ≻ c1; and the following in N :
OBS(alive(turkey), 1), OBS(aim(pj, turkey), 1),
OBS(pull trigger(pj), 1), OBS(¬gun loaded, 4),
OBS(load gun, 5), OBS(pull trigger(pj), 6),
OBS(chirp(bird), 10), OBS(nearby(bird), 10),
with the exact time-point choices being inconsequential.
As we can see in this example the representation of com-
mon sense world knowledge has the form of simple associ-
ations between concepts in the language. This stems from
a key observation in psychology that typically all world
knowledge and irrespective of type is inherently default. It
is not in the form of an elaborate formal theory of detailed
definitions of concepts, but rather is better regarded as a
collection of relatively loose semantic associations between
concepts, reflecting typical rather than absolute information.
Thus knowledge need not be fully qualified at the represen-
tation level, since it can be qualified via the reasoning pro-
cess by the relative strength of other (conflicting) associa-
tions in the knowledge. In particular, as we will see below,
endogenous qualification will be tackled by the priority re-
lation in the theory and exogenous qualification by this pri-
ority coupled with the requirement that explicit narrative in-
formation forms, in effect, non-defeasible arguments.
Argumentation Semantics for Stories
To give the semantics of any given story represen-
tation SR we will formulate a corresponding pref-
erence based argumentation framework of the form
〈Arguments,Disputes,Defences〉. Arguments will be
based on sets of timed unit arguments. Since we are required
to reason about properties over time, it is necessary that ar-
guments populate some connected subset of the time line.
Definition 4. Let SR = 〈W ,N ,≻〉 be a story rep-
resentation. A (unit) argument tuple has the form〈
arg(H,B), T h, d; (X,T )
〉
, where, arg(H,B), is a unit
argument in SR, X is a fluent/event literal, d ∈ {F, B} is
an inference type of either forwards derivation or backwards
derivation by contradiction, and T h, T are time points. T h
refers to the time-point at which the head of the unit argu-
ment applies, while X and T refer to the conclusion drawn
using the unit argument in the tuple. An interpretation ∆
of SR is then defined as a a set of argument tuples. We
say ∆ supports a fluent/event literal, X , at T , if either〈
arg(H,B), T h, d; (X,T )
〉
∈ ∆ or OBS(X,T ) ∈ N . The
notion of support is extended to hold on sets of timed literals.
The inference process of how an argument tuple supports
a timed literal, and thus is allowed to belong to an interpre-
tation, is made precise by the following definition.
Definition 5. Let ∆ be an interpretation and〈
arg(H,B), T h, d; (X,T )
〉
in ∆ with d = F . Then
arg(H,B) applied at T h forward derives X at T under
∆ iff X = H , T = T h and ∆ supports B at T ′. The
set {〈Y, T ′〉 | Y ∈ B} is called the activation condition
for the derivation; T ′ = T h if arg(H,B) is of the form
pro(H,B). T ′ = T h − 1 for the other argument types.
When d = B, arg(H,B) applied at T h backward
derives X at T under ∆ iff ¬X ∈ B and ∆ sup-
ports {¬H} at T h and B \ {¬X} at T . The set{〈
¬H,T h
〉}
∪ {〈Y, T 〉 | Y ∈ B \ {¬X}} is the acti-
vation condition; T = T h if arg(H,B) is of the form
pro(H,B). T = T h − 1 for the other argument types.
The framework thus includes reasoning by contra-
diction with the defeasible world knowledge. Al-
though the psychological debate on the question to
what extent humans reason by contradiction, e.g., by
contraposition, (see, e.g., (Johnson-Laird and Yang 2008;
Rips 1994)) is still ongoing it is natural for a formal ar-
gumentation framework to capture this mode of indirect
reasoning (see, e.g., (Kakas, Toni, and Mancarella 2013;
Kakas and Mancarella 2013)). One of the main conse-
quences of this is that it gives a form of backwards per-
sistence, e.g., from an observation to support (but not nec-
essarily conclude) that the observed property holds also
at previous time points. An argument tuple of the form
〈per(L, ·), T + 1, B; (¬L, T )〉 captures the backwards per-
sistence of ¬L from time T +1 to T using by contraposition
the unit argument of persistence of L from T to T + 1. We
also note that the separation of the inference type (e.g., for-
wards and backwards) is known to be significant in prefer-
ence based argumentation (Modgil and Prakken 2012). This
will be exploited when we consider the attacking between
arguments: their disputes and defences.
To reflect the suggestion by psychology that inferences
drawn by readers are strongly tied to the story we require
that the activation conditions of argument tuples must be
eventually traced on the explicit information in the narrative
of the story representation.
Definition 6. An interpretation ∆ is grounded on SR iff
there is a total ordering of ∆ such that the activation condi-
tion of any tuple α ∈ ∆ is supported by the set of tuples that
precede α in the ordering or by the narrative in SR.
Hence in a grounded interpretation there can be no cycles
in the tuples that support their activation conditions and so
these will always end with tuples whose activation condi-
tions will be supported directly by the observations in the
narrative of the story.
We can now define the argumentation framework corre-
sponding to any given story representation. The central task
is to capture through the argumentation semantics the non-
monotonic reasoning of linking the narrative to the defeasi-
ble information in the world knowledge. In particular, the
argumentation will need to capture the qualification prob-
lem, encompassed in this synthesis of the narrative with the
world knowledge, both at the level of static reasoning at one
time point with default property arguments and at the level
of temporal projection from one time point to another.
Definition 7. Let SR be a story representation.
Then the corresponding argumentation framework,〈
ARGSR, DISSR, DEFSR
〉
is defined as follows:
• An argument, A, in ARGSR is any grounded interpreta-
tion of SR.
• Given an argument A then A is in conflict with SR iff
there exists a tuple α =
〈
arg(H,B), T h, d; (X,T )
〉
in A
such that OBS(¬X,T ) ∈ N of SR.
• Given two arguments A1, A2 then these are in (direct)
conflict with each other iff there exists a tuple α2 =〈
arg
2
(H2, B2), T
h
2
, d2; (X2, T2)
〉
inA2 and a tupleα1 =〈
arg
1
(H1, B1), T
h
1
, d1; (X1, T1)
〉
in A1 such that X1 =
¬X2, T1 = T2. Given two arguments A1, A2 then these
are in indirect conflict with each other iff there exists a tu-
ple α2 =
〈
arg
2
(H2, B2), T
h
2
, d2; (X2, T2)
〉
in A2 and a
tuple α1 =
〈
arg
1
(H1, B1), T
h
1
, d1; (X1, T1)
〉
in A1 such
that (d1 = B or d2 = B) and H1 = ¬H2, T h1 = T h2 .
• Given two arguments A1, A2 then A2 disputes A1 and
hence (A2, A1) ∈ DISSR iff A2 is in direct or indirect
conflict with A1, and in the case of indirect conflict d1 =
B holds in the definition of indirect conflict above.
• ArgumentA1 undercuts A2 iff
– A1, A2 are in direct or indirect conflict via α1 and α2,
– when in direct conflict, there exists a tuple α′
1
=〈
arg
′
1
(H ′
1
, B′
1
), T h
′
1
, d′
1
; (X ′
1
, T ′
1
)
〉
in A1 and a tuple
α′
2
=
〈
arg
′
2
(H ′
2
, B′
2
), T h
′
2
, d′
2
; (X ′
2
, T ′
2
)
〉
in A2 such
that arg′
1
(H ′
1
, B′
1
) ≻ arg′
2
(H ′
2
, B′
2
) and T ′
1
= T
′
2
or
T h
′
1
= T h
′
2
.
– when in indirect conflict, then arg
1
(H1, B1) ≻
arg
2
(H2, B2) where arg1(H1, B1) and arg2(H2, B2)
are the unit arguments in α1 and α2 respectively.
• Argument A1 defends against A2 and hence (A1, A2) ∈
DEFSR, iff there exists a subset A′
2
⊆ A2 which is in
minimal conflict with A1 (i.e., no proper subset of A′2 is
in conflict with A1) and A1 undercuts A′2.
Several clarifying comments are in order. Arguments
that are in dispute are arguments that support some contrary
conclusion at the same time point and hence form counter-
arguments for each other. The use of contrapositive rea-
soning for backwards inference also means that it is pos-
sible to have arguments that support conclusions that are not
contrary to each other but whose unit arguments have con-
flicting conclusions. For example, in our running example
we can use the causal unit argument, c1, to forward derive
fired at(pj,X) and the property argument p1 to backwards
derive gun loaded from ¬fired at(pj,X) and despite the
fact that the derived facts are not in conflict the unit argu-
ments used concern conflicting conclusions. Hence such ar-
guments are also considered to be in conflict but instead of
a direct conflict we say we have an indirect conflict. Not all
such indirect conflicts are important. A dispute that results
from an indirect conflict of a unit argument used backwards
on a unit argument that is used forwards does not have any
effect. Such cases are excluded from giving rise to disputes.
This complication in the definitions of conflicts and dis-
putes results from the defeasible nature of the world knowl-
edge and the fact we are allowing reasoning by contradiction
on such defeasible information. These complications in fact
stem from the fact that we are only approximating the proof
by contradiction reasoning, capturing this indirectly through
contraposition. The study of this is beyond the scope of this
paper and the reader is referred to the newly formulated Ar-
gumentation Logic (Kakas, Toni, and Mancarella 2013).
Undercuts between arguments require that the undercut-
ting argument does so through a stronger unit or premise
argument than some unit argument in the argument that is
undercut. The defence relation is build out of undercuts by
applying an undercut on minimally conflicting subsets of the
argument which we are defending against. Hence these two
relations between arguments are asymmetric. Note also that
the stronger premise from the undercutting argument does
not necessarily need to come from the subset of the unit ar-
guments that supports the conflicting conclusion. Instead, it
can come from any part of the undercutting argument to un-
dercut at any point of the chain supporting the activation of
the conflicting conclusion. This, as we shall illustrate below,
is linked to how the framework addresses the ramification
problem of reasoning with actions and change.
The semantics of a story representation is defined using
the corresponding argumentation framework as follows.
Definition 8. Let SR be a story representation and〈
ARGSR, DISSR, DEFSR
〉
its corresponding argumen-
tation framework. An argument ∆ is acceptable in SR iff
• ∆ is not in conflict with SR nor in direct conflict with ∆.
• No argument A undercuts ∆.
• For any argument A that minimally disputes ∆, ∆ de-
fends against A.
Acceptable arguments are called comprehension models
of SR. Given a comprehension model ∆, a timed fluent
literal (X,T ) is entailed by SR iff this is supported by ∆.
The above definition of comprehension model and story
entailment is of a sceptical form where, apart from the fact
that all conclusions must be ground on the narrative, they
must also not be non-deterministic in the sense that there
can not exist another comprehension model where the neg-
ative conclusion is entailed. Separating disputes and un-
dercuts and identifying defences with undercuts facilitates
this sceptical form of entailment. Undercuts (see, e.g.,
(Modgil and Prakken 2012) for some recent discussion) are
strong counter-claims whose existence means that the at-
tacked set is inappropriate for sceptical conclusions whereas
disputes are weak counter-claims that could be defended
or invalidated by extending the argument to undercut them
back. Also the explicit condition that an acceptable argu-
ment should not be undercut even if it can undercut back
means that this definition does not allow non-deterministic
choices for arguments that can defend themselves.
To illustrate the formal framework, how arguments
are constructed and how a comprehension of a story
is formed through acceptable arguments let us consider
our example story starting from the end of the sec-
ond paragraph, corresponding to time-points 1-3 in the
example narrative. Note that the empty ∆ supports
aim(pj, turkey) and pull trigger(pj) at 1. Hence, c1
on 2 forward activates fired at(pj, turkey) at 2 under
the empty argument, ∆. We can thus populate ∆ with
〈c1, 2, F; (fired at(pj, turkey), 2)〉. Similarly, we can in-
clude 〈per(alive(turkey), ·), 2, F; (alive(turkey), 2)〉 in
the new ∆. Under this latter ∆, c2 on 3 forward acti-
vates ¬alive(turkey) at 3, allowing us to further extend
∆ with 〈c2, 3, F; (¬alive(turkey), 3)〉. The resulting ∆ is
a grounded interpretation that supports ¬alive(turkey) at
3. It is based on this inference, that we expect readers to
respond that the first turkey is dead, when asked about its
status at this point, since no other argument grounded on the
narrative (thus far) can support a qualification argument to
this inference. Note also that we can include in ∆ the tu-
ple 〈p1, 2, B; (gun loaded, 1)〉 to support, using backwards
(contrapositive) reasoning with p1, the conclusion that the
gun was loaded when it was fired at time 1.
Reading the first sentence of the third paragraph, we learn
that OBS(¬gun loaded, 4). We now expect that this new
piece of evidence will lead readers to revise their infer-
ences as now we have an argument to support the conclusion
¬fired at(pj, turkey) based on the stronger (qualifying)
unit argument of p1. For this we need to support the activa-
tion condition of p1 at time 1, i.e., to support ¬gun loaded
at 1. To do this we can use the argument tuples:
〈per(gun loaded, ·), 4, B; (¬gun loaded, 3)〉
〈per(gun loaded, ·), 3, B; (¬gun loaded, 2)〉
〈per(gun loaded, ·), 2, B; (¬gun loaded, 1)〉
which support the conclusion that the gun was also un-
loaded before it was observed to be so. This uses
per(gun loaded, ·) contrapositively to backward activate
the unit argument of persistence, e.g., had the gun been
loaded at 3, it would have been so at 4 which would con-
tradict the story. Note that this backwards inference of
¬gun loaded would be qualified by a causal argument for
¬gun loaded at any time earlier than 4, e.g., if the world
knowledge contained the unit argument
c : cau(¬gun loaded, {pull trigger(pj)})
This then supports an indirect conflict at time 2 with the
forwards persistence of gun loaded from 1 to 2 and due to
the stronger nature of unit causal over persistence arguments
the backwards inference of ¬gun loaded is undercut and so
cannot belong to an acceptable argument.
Assuming that c is absent, the argument, ∆1, consist-
ing of these three “persistence” tuples is in conflict on
gun loaded on 1 with the argument ∆ above. Each ar-
gument disputes the other and in fact neither can form
an acceptable argument. If we extend ∆1 with the tuple
〈p1, 2, F; (¬fired at(pj, turkey), 2)〉 then this can now un-
dercut and thus defend against ∆ using the priority of p1
over c1. Therefore the extended ∆1 is acceptable and the
conclusion¬fired at(pj, turkey) at 2 is drawn revising the
previous conclusions drawn from ∆. The process of under-
standing our story may then proceed by extending ∆1, with
〈per(alive(turkey), ·), T, F; (alive(turkey), T )〉 for T =
2, 3, 4, resulting in a model that supports alive(turkey) at
4. It is based on this inference that we expect readers to
respond that the first turkey is alive at 4.
Continuing with the story, after Papa Joe loads the gun
and fires again, we can support by forward inferences that
the gun fired, that noise was caused, and that the bird stopped
chirping, through a chaining of the unit arguments c1, c3, c4.
But OBS(chirp(bird), 10) supports disputes on all these
through the repeated backwards use of the same unit argu-
ments grounded on this observation. We thus have an exoge-
nous qualification effect where these conclusions can not be
sceptical and so will not be supported by any comprehension
model. But if we also consider the stronger (story specific)
information in p2, that this gun does not fire without a noise,
together with the backwards inference of ¬noise an argu-
ment that contains these can undercut the firing of the gun at
time 2 and thus defend against disputes that are grounded on
pull triger at 1 and the gun firing. As a result, we have the
effect of blocking the ramification of the causation of noise
and so ¬noise (as well as ¬fired at(pj, turkey)) are scep-
tically concluded. Readers, indeed respond in this way.
With this latter part of the example story we see how
our framework addresses the ramification problem and
its non-trivial interaction with the qualification problem
(Thielscher 2001). In fact, a generalized form of this prob-
lem is addressed where the ramifications are not chained
only through causal laws but through any of the forms of
inference we have in the framework — causal, property or
persistence — and through any of the type of inference —
forwards or backwards by contradiction.
A comprehension model can be tested, as is often done in
psychology, through a series of multiple-choice questions.
Definition 9. Let M be a comprehension model of a story
representation SR. A possible answer,“X at T ”, to a ques-
tion is accepted, respectively rejected, iff “X at T ” (respec-
tively “¬X at T ”) is supported by M . Otherwise, we say
that the question is allowed or possible by M .
In some cases, we may want to extend the notion of a
comprehension model to allow some non-sceptical entail-
ments. This is needed to reflect the situation when a reader
cannot find a sceptical answer to a question and chooses be-
tween two or more allowed answers. This can be captured
by allowing each such answer to be supported by a more
general notion of acceptability such as the admissibility cri-
terion of argumentation semantics. For this, we can drop the
condition that ∆ is not undercut by any argument and al-
low weaker defences, through disputes, to defend back on a
dispute that is not at the same time an undercut.
Finally, we note that a comprehension model need not be
complete as it does not need to contain all possible sceptical
conclusions that can be drawn from the narrative and the
entire world knowledge. It is a subset of this, given by the
subset of the available world knowledge that readers choose
to use. This incompleteness of the comprehension model
is required for important cognitive economy and coherence
properties of comprehension, as trivially a “full model” is
contrary to the notion of coherence.
Computing Comprehension Models
The computational procedure below constructs a compre-
hension model, by iteratively reading a new part of the story
SR, retracting existing inferences that are no longer appro-
priate, and including new inferences that are triggered as a
result of the new story part. Each part of the story may in-
clude more than one observation, much in the same way that
human readers may be asked to read multiple sentences in
the story before being asked to answer a question. We shall
call each story part of interest a block, and shall assume that
it is provided as input to the computational procedure.
At a high level the procedure proceeds as in Algorithm 1.
The story is read one block at a time. After each block
of SR is read, a directed acyclic graph G[b] is maintained
which succinctly encodes all interpretations that are relevant
for SR up to its b-th block. Starting from G[b − 1], a new
tuple is added as a vertex if it is possible to add a directed
edge to each 〈X,T 〉 in the tuple’s condition from either an
observation OBS(X,T ) in the narrative of SR[b], or from a
tuple
〈
arg(H,B), T h, d; (X,T )
〉
already in G[b]. In effect,
then, edges correspond to the notion of support from the pre-
ceding section, and the graph is the maximal grounded inter-
pretation given the part of the story read.
Once graph G[b] is computed, it is used to revise the com-
prehension model ∆[b − 1] so that it takes into account the
observations in SR[b]
Algorithm 1 Computing a Comprehension Model
input: story SR, partitioned in a list of k blocks, and a
set of questions Q[b] associated with each SR block b.
Set G[0] to be the empty graph.
for every b = 1, 2, . . . , k do
Let SR[b] be the restriction of SR up to its b-th block.
Let G[b] := graph(G[b− 1],SR[b]) be the new graph.
Let Π[b] := retract(∆[b − 1],G[b],SR[b]).
Let ∆[b] := elaborate(Π[b],G[b],SR[b]).
Answer Q[b] with the comprehension model ∆[b].
end for
In the first step, the tuples in ∆[b−1] are considered in the
order in which they were added, and each one is checked to
see whether it should remain in the comprehension model.
Any tuple in ∆[b−1] that is undercut by the tuples in G[b], or
disputed and cannot be defended, is retracted, and is not in-
cluded in the provisional set Π[b]. As a result of a retraction,
any tuple
〈
arg(H,B), T h, d; (X,T )
〉
∈ ∆[b − 1] such that
arg(H,B) no longer activates X at T under Π[b] is also re-
tracted and is not included in Π[b]. This step guarantees that
the argument Π[b] is trivially acceptable.
In the second step, the provisional set Π[b], which is itself
a comprehension model (but likely a highly incomplete one),
is elaborated with new inferences that follow. The elabo-
ration process proceeds as in Algorithm 2. Since the pro-
visional comprehension model Π effectively includes only
unit arguments that are “strong” against the attacks from G,
it is used to remove (only as part of the local computation of
this procedure) any weak arguments from G itself (i.e., ar-
guments that are undercut), and any arguments that depend
on the former to activate their inferences. This step, then,
ensures that all arguments (subsets of G) that are defended
are no longer part of the revised G, in effect accommodating
the minimality condition for attacking sets. It then consid-
ers all arguments that activate their inferences in the pro-
visional comprehension model. The comprehension model
is expanded with a new tuple from E if the tuple is not in
conflict with the story nor in direct conflict with the current
model ∆, and if “attacked” by arguments in G then these
arguments do not undercut ∆, and ∆ undercuts back. Only
arguments coming from the revised graph G are considered,
as per the minimality criterion on considered attacks.
The elaboration process adds only “strong” arguments in
the comprehension model, retaining its property as a com-
prehension model. The discussion above forms the basis for
the proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 runs in time that is polynomial in
the size of SR and the number of time-points of interest,
and returns a comprehension model of the story.
Proof sketch. Correctness follows from our earlier discus-
sion. Regarding running time: The number of iterations of
the top-level algorithm is at most linear in the relevant pa-
rameters. In constructing the graph G[b], each pair of ele-
Algorithm 2 Elaborating a Comprehension Model
input: provisional comprehension model Π, graph G,
story SR; all inputs possibly restricted up to some block.
repeat
Let G := retract(Π,G,SR).
Let E include all tuples
〈
arg(H,B), T h, d; (X,T )
〉
such that arg(H,B) activates X at T under Π.
Let Π := ∆.
Let Π := expand(∆, E,G).
until ∆ = Π
output: elaborated comprehension model ∆.
ments (unit arguments or observations at some time-point)
in SR[b] is considered once, for a constant number of op-
erations. The same is the case for the retraction process in
the subsequent step of the algorithm. Finally, the loop of the
elaboration process repeats at most a linear in the relevant
parameters number of times, since at least one new tuple is
included in Π in every loop. Within each loop, each step
considers each pair of elements (unit arguments or obser-
vations at some time-point) in SR[b] once, for a constant
number of operations. The claim follows. QED
The computational processes presented above have been
implemented using Prolog, along with an accompanying
high-level language for representing narratives, background
knowledge, and multiple-choice questions. Without going
into details, the language allows the user to specify a se-
quence of sessions of the form session(s(B),Qs,Vs),
where B is the next story block to read, Qs is the set of ques-
tions to be answered afterwards, and Vs is the set of fluents
made visible in a comprehension model returned to the user.
The narrative itself is represented by a sequence of state-
ments of the form s(B) :: X at T, where B is the
block in which the statement belongs (with possibly mul-
tiple statements belonging in the same block), X is a fluent
or action, and T is the time-point at which it is observed.
The background knowledge is represented by clauses of
the form p(N) :: A, B, ..., C implies X or
c(N) :: A, B, ..., C causes X, where p or c
shows a property or causal clause, N is the name of the rule,
A, B, ..., C is the rule’s body, and X is the rule’s head.
Negations are represented by prefixing a fluent or action in
the body or head with the minus symbol. Variables can be
used in the fluents or actions to represent relational rules.
Preferences between clauses are represented by statements
of the form p(N1) >> c(N2) with the natural reading.
Questions are represented by clauses of the form q(N)
?? (X1 at T1, ..., X2 at T2) ; ..., where
N is the name of the question, (X1 at T1, ..., X2
at T2) is the first possible answer as a conjunction of flu-
ents or actions that need to hold at their respective time-
points, and ; separates the answers. The question is always
the same: “Which of the following choices is the case?”.
The implemented system demonstrates real modularity
and elaboration tolerance, allowing as input any story nar-
rative or background knowledge in the given syntax, al-
ways appropriately qualifying the given information to com-
pute a comprehension model. The system is available at
http://cognition.ouc.ac.cy/narrative/.
Evaluation through Empirical Studies
In the first part of the evaluation of our approach we car-
ried a psychological study to ascertain the world knowledge
that is activated to successfully comprehend example stories
such as our example story on the basis of data obtained from
human readers. We were interested both in the outcomes
of successful comprehension and the world knowledge that
contributed to the human comprehension. We developed
a set of inferential questions to follow the reading of pre-
specified story segments. These assessed the extent to which
readers connected, explained, and elaborated key story ele-
ments. Readers were instructed to answer each question and
to justify their answers using a “think-aloud” method of an-
swering questions while reading in order to reveal the world
knowledge that they had used.
The qualitative data from the readers was pooled together
and analysed as to the frequencies of the types of responses
in conjunction with the information given in justifications
and think-aloud protocols. For example, the data indicated
that all readers considered Papa Joe to be living on a farm
or in a village (q.01, “Where does Papa Joe live?”) and
that all readers attributed an intention of Papa Joe to hunt
(q.06, “What was Papa Joe doing in the forest?”). An in-
teresting example of variability occurred in the answers for
the group of questions 07,08,10,11, asking about the status
of the turkeys at various stages in the story. The major-
ity of participants followed a comprehension model which
was revised between the first turkey being dead and alive.
However, a minority of participants consistently answered
that both turkeys were alive. These readers had defeated the
causal arguments that supported the inference that the first
turkey was dead, perhaps based on an expectation that the
desire of the protagonist for turkey would be met with com-
plications. We believe that such expectations can be gener-
ated from standard story knowledge in the same way as we
draw other elaborative inferences from WK.
Evaluation of the system
Using the empirical data discussed above, we tested our
framework’s ability to capture the majority answers and ac-
count for their variability. The parts of our example story
representation relevant to questions 01 and 06 are as follows:
s(1) :: night at 0. s(2) :: animal(turkey2) at 2.
s(1) :: xmasEve at 0. s(2) :: alive(turkey1) at 2.
s(1) :: clean(pj,barn) at 0. s(2) :: alive(turkey2) at 2.
s(2) :: xmasDay at 1. s(2) :: chirp(bird) at 2.
s(2) :: gun(pjGun) at 1. s(2) :: nearby(bird) at 2.
s(2) :: longWalk(pj) at 1. s(2) :: aim(pjGun,turkey1) at 2.
s(2) :: animal(turkey1) at 2. s(2) :: pulltrigger(pjGun) at 2.
The two questions are answered after reading, respec-
tively, the first and second blocks of the story above:
session(s(1),[q(01)], ). session(s(2),[q(06)], ).
with their corresponding multiple-choice answers being:
q(01) ??
lives(pj,city) at 0; lives(pj,hotel) at 0;
lives(pj,farm) at 0; lives(pj,village) at 0.
q(06) ??
motive(in(pj,forest),practiceShoot) at 3;
motive(in(pj,forest),huntFor(food)) at 3;
(motive(in(pj,forest),catch(turkey1)) at 3,
motive(in(pj,forest),catch(turkey2)) at 3);
motive(in(pj,forest),hearBirdsChirp) at 3.
To answer the first question, the system uses the following
background knowledge:
p(11) :: has(home(pj),barn) implies lives(pj,countrySide).
p(12) :: true implies -lives(pj,hotel).
p(13) :: true implies lives(pj,city).
p(14) :: has(home(pj),barn) implies -lives(pj,city).
p(15) :: clean(pj,barn) implies at(pj,barn).
p(16) :: at(pj,home), at(pj,barn) implies has(home(pj),barn).
p(17) :: xmasEve, night implies at(pj,home).
p(18) :: working(pj) implies -at(pj,home).
p(111) :: lives(pj,countrySide) implies lives(pj,village).
p(112) :: lives(pj,countrySide) implies lives(pj,farm).
p(113) :: lives(pj,village) implies -lives(pj,farm).
p(114) :: lives(pj,farm) implies -lives(pj,village).
p(14) >> p(13). p(18) >> p(17).
By the story information, p(17) implies at(pj,home), with-
out being attacked by p(18), since nothing is said in the story
about Papa Joe working. Also by the story information,
p(15) implies at(pj,barn). Combining the inferences from
above, p(16) implies has(home(pj),barn), and p(11) implies
lives(pj,countrySide). p(12) immediately dismisses the case
of living in a hotel (as people usually do not), whereas p(14)
overrides p(13) and dismisses the case of living in the city.
Yet, the background knowledge cannot unambiguously de-
rive one of the remaining two answers. In fact, p(111),
p(112), p(113), p(114) give arguments for either of the two
choices. This is in line with the variability in the empirical
data in terms of human answers to the first question.
To answer the second question, the system uses the fol-
lowing background knowledge:
p(21) :: want(pj,foodFor(dinner)) implies
motive(in(pj,forest),huntFor(food)).
p(22) :: hunter(pj) implies
motive(in(pj,forest),huntFor(food)).
p(23) :: firedat(pjGun,X), animal(X) implies
-motive(in(pj,forest),catch(X)).
p(24) :: firedat(pjGun,X), animal(X) implies
-motive(in(pj,forest),hearBirdsChirp).
p(25) :: xmasDay implies
want(pj,foodFor(dinner)).
p(26) :: longWalk(pj) implies
-motive(in(pj,forest),practiceShooting).
p(27) :: xmasDay implies
-motive(in(pj,forest),practiceShooting).
By the story information and parts of the background
knowledge not shown above, we can derive that Papa Joe is a
hunter, and that he has fired at a turkey. From the first infer-
ence, p(22) already implies that the motivation is to hunt for
food. The same inference can be derived by p(25) and p(21),
although for a different reason. At the same time, p(23) and
p(24) dismiss the possibility of the motivation being to catch
the two turkeys or to hear birds chirp, whereas story infor-
mation along with either p(26) or p(27) dismiss also the pos-
sibility of the motivation being to practice shooting.
The background knowledge above follows evidence from
the participant responses in our psychological study that the
motives in the answers of the second question can be “de-
rived” from higher-level desires or goals of the actor. Such
high-level desires and intentions are examples of generaliza-
tions that contribute to the coherence of comprehension, and
to the creation of expectations in readers about the course
of action that the story might follow in relation to fulfilling
desires and achieving intentions of the protagonists.
Related Work
Automated story understanding has been an ongoing field
of AI research for the last forty years, starting with the
planning and goal-oriented approaches of Schank, Abelson,
Dyer and others (Schank and Abelson 1977; Dyer 1983);
for a good overview see (Mueller 2002) and the web-
site (Mueller 2013). Logic-related approaches have largely
been concerned with the development of appropriate repre-
sentations, translations or annotations of narratives, with the
implicit or explicit assumption that standard deduction or
logical reasoning techniques can subsequently be applied to
these. For example, the work of Mueller (Mueller 2003),
which in terms of story representation is most closely re-
lated to our approach, equates various modes of story
understanding with the solving of satisfiability problems.
(Niehaus and Young 2009) models understanding as partial
order planning, and is also of interest here because of a
methodology that includes a controlled comparison with hu-
man readers.
To our knowledge there has been very little work relat-
ing story comprehension with computational argumentation,
an exception being (Bex and Verheij 2013), in which a case
is made for combining narrative and argumentation tech-
niques in the context of legal reasoning, and with which
our argumentation framework shares important similarities.
Argumentation for reasoning about actions and change, on
which our formal framework builds, has been studied in
(Vo and Foo 2005; Michael and Kakas 2009).
Many other authors have emphasized the impor-
tance of commonsense knowledge and reasoning in
story comprehension (Silva and Montgomery 1977;
Dahlgren, McDowell, and Stabler 1989; Riloff 1999;
Mueller 2004; Mueller 2009; Verheij 2009;
Elson and McKeown 2009; Michael 2010), and indeed
how it can offer a basis for story comprehension tasks
beyond question answering (Michael 2013b).
Conclusions and Future Work
We have set up a conceptual framework for story compre-
hension by fusing together knowhow from the psychology
of text comprehension with established AI techniques and
theory in the areas of Reasoning about Actions and Change
and Argumentation. We have developed a proof of concept
automated system to evaluate the applicability of our frame-
work through a similar empirical process of evaluating hu-
man readers. We are currently, carrying out psychological
experiments with other stories to harness world knowledge
and test our system against the human readers.
There are still several problems that we need to address to
complete a fully automated approach to SC, over and above
the problem of extracting through Natural Language Pro-
cessing techniques the narrative from the free format text.
Two major such problems for our immediate future work
are (a) to address further the computational aspects of the
challenges of cognitive economy and coherence and (b) the
systematic extraction or acquisition of common sense world
knowledge. For the first of these we will investigate how this
can be addressed by applying “computational heuristics” on
top of (and without the need to reexamine) the solid semantic
framework that we have developed thus far, drawing again
from psychology to formulate such heuristics. In particu-
lar, we expect that the psychological studies will guide us in
modularly introducing computational operators such as se-
lection, dropping and generalization operators so that we
can improve the coherence of the computed models.
For the problem of the systematic acquisition of world
knowledge we aim to source this (semi)-automatically
from the Web. For this we could build on lexical
databases such as WordNet (Miller 1995), FrameNet
(Baker, Fillmore, and Lowe 1998), and PropBank
(Palmer, Gildea, and Kingsbury 2005), exploring the
possibility of populating the world knowledge theo-
ries using archives for common sense knowledge (e.g.,
Cyc (Lenat 1995)) or through the automated extraction
of commonsense knowledge from text using natu-
ral language processing (Michael and Valiant 2008),
and appealing to textual entailment for the se-
mantics of the extracted knowledge (Michael 2009;
Michael 2013a).
We envisage that the strong inter-disciplinary nature of
our work can provide a concrete and important test bed for
evaluating the development of NMR frameworks in AI while
at the same time offering valuable feedback for Psychology.
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